session: calculate ap key
This commit is contained in:
parent
73f95555eb
commit
4b644aafe9
350
src/session.rs
350
src/session.rs
@ -685,8 +685,6 @@ impl<'a> Session<'a> {
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// Compute verify_data using HMAC
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let mut hmac = Hmac::<Sha384>::new_varkey(&okm).unwrap();
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hmac.update(&transcript_hash);
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log::info!("HMAC: {:?}", hmac);
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log::info!("Received data: {:?}", server_verify_data);
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hmac.verify(server_verify_data).unwrap();
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// Update hash for key computation
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@ -954,6 +952,312 @@ impl<'a> Session<'a> {
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self.hash.update(certificate_verify_slice);
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}
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pub(crate) fn server_update_for_server_finished(
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&mut self,
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server_finished_slice: &[u8]
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) {
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// Update hash for key computation
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self.hash.update(server_finished_slice);
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// Key calculation
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if let Ok(sha256) = self.hash.get_sha256_clone() {
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// Derive application traffic secret, key, IV on client's side
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// 1. Derive secret from "Handshake Secret"
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let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(
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// TLS requires the removal of secret if such secret is not of any use
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// Replace "latest_secret" with None
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self.latest_secret.as_ref().unwrap()
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).unwrap();
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let empty_hash = Sha256::new().chain("");
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let derived_secret = derive_secret(&hkdf, "derived", empty_hash);
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// 2. HKDF-extract "Master Secret"
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let zero_ikm: GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>
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= Default::default();
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let (master_secret, master_secret_hkdf) = Hkdf::<Sha256>::extract(
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Some(&derived_secret),
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&zero_ikm
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);
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// Replace latest secret with "master_secret"
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self.latest_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&master_secret).unwrap()
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);
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// 3. Get application traffic secret
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let client_application_traffic_secret = derive_secret(
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&master_secret_hkdf,
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"c ap traffic",
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self.hash.get_sha256_clone().unwrap()
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);
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let server_application_traffic_secret = derive_secret(
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&master_secret_hkdf,
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"s ap traffic",
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self.hash.get_sha256_clone().unwrap()
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);
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self.client_application_traffic_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&client_application_traffic_secret).unwrap()
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);
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self.server_application_traffic_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&server_application_traffic_secret).unwrap()
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);
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// 4. Replace cipher and IV
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let client_application_traffic_hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(
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&client_application_traffic_secret
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).unwrap();
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let server_application_traffic_hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(
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&server_application_traffic_secret
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).unwrap();
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// Init key and IV holders
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let cipher_suite = self.client_handshake_cipher.as_ref().unwrap().get_cipher_suite_type();
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let (mut client_key_holder, mut client_iv_holder,
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mut server_key_holder, mut server_iv_holder):
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(Vec::<u8, U64>, Vec::<u8, U12>, Vec::<u8, U64>, Vec::<u8, U12>) =
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match cipher_suite {
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 => {
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(
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 16]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 16]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap()
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)
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},
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CipherSuite::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => {
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(
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap()
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)
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},
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 => {
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(
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 16]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 16]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap()
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)
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},
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// TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 is not offered
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// TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 should not have SHA256 as hash
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_ => unreachable!()
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};
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// Derive Key and IV for both server and client
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&client_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"key",
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"",
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&mut client_key_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&client_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"iv",
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"",
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&mut client_iv_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&server_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"key",
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"",
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&mut server_key_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&server_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"iv",
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"",
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&mut server_iv_holder
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);
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// Store IV/nonce
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self.client_application_nonce.replace(client_iv_holder);
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self.server_application_nonce.replace(server_iv_holder);
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// Instantiate new ciphers
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match cipher_suite {
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 => {
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self.client_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Aes128Gcm {
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aes128gcm: Aes128Gcm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&client_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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self.server_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Aes128Gcm {
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aes128gcm: Aes128Gcm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&server_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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},
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CipherSuite::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => {
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self.client_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Chacha20poly1305 {
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chacha20poly1305: ChaCha20Poly1305::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&client_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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self.server_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Chacha20poly1305 {
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chacha20poly1305: ChaCha20Poly1305::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&server_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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},
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 => {
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self.client_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Ccm {
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ccm: Aes128Ccm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&client_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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self.server_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Ccm {
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ccm: Aes128Ccm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&server_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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},
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_ => unreachable!()
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}
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} else if let Ok(sha384) = self.hash.get_sha384_clone() {
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// Derive application traffic secret, key, IV on client's side
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// 1. Derive secret from "Handshake Secret"
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let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha384>::from_prk(
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self.latest_secret.as_ref().unwrap()
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).unwrap();
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let empty_hash = Sha384::new().chain("");
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let derived_secret = derive_secret(&hkdf, "derived", empty_hash);
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// 2. HKDF-extract "Master Secret"
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let zero_ikm: GenericArray<u8, <Sha384 as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>
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= Default::default();
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let (master_secret, master_secret_hkdf) = Hkdf::<Sha384>::extract(
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Some(&derived_secret),
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&zero_ikm
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);
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// Replace latest secret with "master_secret"
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self.latest_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&master_secret).unwrap()
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);
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// 3. Get application traffic secret
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let client_application_traffic_secret = derive_secret(
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&master_secret_hkdf,
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"c ap traffic",
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self.hash.get_sha384_clone().unwrap()
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);
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let server_application_traffic_secret = derive_secret(
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&master_secret_hkdf,
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"s ap traffic",
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self.hash.get_sha384_clone().unwrap()
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);
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self.client_application_traffic_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&client_application_traffic_secret).unwrap()
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);
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self.server_application_traffic_secret.replace(
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Vec::from_slice(&server_application_traffic_secret).unwrap()
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);
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// 4. Replace cipher and IV
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let client_application_traffic_hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha384>::from_prk(
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&client_application_traffic_secret
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).unwrap();
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let server_application_traffic_hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha384>::from_prk(
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&server_application_traffic_secret
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).unwrap();
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// Init key and IV holders
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let cipher_suite = self.client_handshake_cipher.as_ref().unwrap().get_cipher_suite_type();
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let (mut client_key_holder, mut client_iv_holder,
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mut server_key_holder, mut server_iv_holder):
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(Vec::<u8, U64>, Vec::<u8, U12>, Vec::<u8, U64>, Vec::<u8, U12>) =
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match cipher_suite {
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => {
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(
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(),
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Vec::from_slice(&[0; 12]).unwrap()
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)
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},
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// TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 is not offered
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// Only TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 should have SHA384 as hash
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_ => unreachable!()
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};
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// Derive Key and IV for both server and client
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&client_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"key",
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"",
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&mut client_key_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&client_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"iv",
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"",
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&mut client_iv_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&server_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"key",
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"",
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&mut server_key_holder
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);
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hkdf_expand_label(
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&server_application_traffic_hkdf,
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"iv",
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"",
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&mut server_iv_holder
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);
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// Store IV/nonce
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self.client_application_nonce.replace(client_iv_holder);
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self.server_application_nonce.replace(server_iv_holder);
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// Instantiate new ciphers
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match cipher_suite {
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CipherSuite::TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => {
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self.client_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Aes256Gcm {
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aes256gcm: Aes256Gcm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&client_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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self.server_application_cipher.replace(
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Cipher::Aes256Gcm {
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aes256gcm: Aes256Gcm::new(
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&GenericArray::from_slice(&server_key_holder)
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)
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}
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);
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},
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_ => unreachable!()
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}
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} else {
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unreachable!()
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};
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}
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fn find_handshake_keying_info(&mut self, shared_secret_bytes: &[u8], cipher_suite: CipherSuite) {
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// Ensure that it is 32-bytes long
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assert!(shared_secret_bytes.len() == 32);
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@ -1596,6 +1900,48 @@ impl<'a> Session<'a> {
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn get_server_finished_verify_data(&self) -> Vec<u8, U64> {
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if let Ok(sha256) = self.hash.get_sha256_clone() {
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let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(
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self.server_handshake_traffic_secret.as_ref().unwrap()
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).unwrap();
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// Compute finished_key
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let mut okm: GenericArray::<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize> =
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Default::default();
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hkdf_expand_label(&hkdf, "finished", "", &mut okm);
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// Get transcript hash
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let transcript_hash = sha256.finalize();
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// Compute verify_data, store in heapless vec
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let mut hmac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&okm).unwrap();
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hmac.update(&transcript_hash);
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Vec::from_slice(&hmac.finalize().into_bytes()).unwrap()
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} else if let Ok(sha384) = self.hash.get_sha384_clone() {
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let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha384>::from_prk(
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self.server_handshake_traffic_secret.as_ref().unwrap()
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).unwrap();
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// Compute finished_key
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let mut okm: GenericArray::<u8, <Sha384 as Digest>::OutputSize> =
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Default::default();
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hkdf_expand_label(&hkdf, "finished", "", &mut okm);
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// Get transcript hash
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let transcript_hash = sha384.finalize();
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// Compute verify_data, store in heapless vec
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let mut hmac = Hmac::<Sha384>::new_varkey(&okm).unwrap();
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hmac.update(&transcript_hash);
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Vec::from_slice(&hmac.finalize().into_bytes()).unwrap()
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} else {
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unreachable!()
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn get_cipher_suite_type(&self) -> Option<CipherSuite> {
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self.client_handshake_cipher.as_ref().map(|cipher| cipher.get_cipher_suite_type())
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}
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23
src/tls.rs
23
src/tls.rs
@ -631,6 +631,29 @@ impl<'s> TlsSocket<'s> {
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&inner_plaintext[..(inner_plaintext_length-1)]
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);
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}
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// Construct and send server finished
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let inner_plaintext: HeaplessVec<u8, U64> = {
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let verify_data = self.session.borrow()
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.get_server_finished_verify_data();
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let mut handshake_header: [u8; 4] = [20, 0, 0, 0];
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NetworkEndian::write_u24(
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&mut handshake_header[1..4],
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u32::try_from(verify_data.len()).unwrap()
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);
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let mut buffer = HeaplessVec::from_slice(&handshake_header).unwrap();
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buffer.extend_from_slice(&verify_data).unwrap();
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// Inner plaintext: record type
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buffer.push(22).unwrap();
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buffer
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};
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self.send_application_slice(sockets, &mut inner_plaintext.clone())?;
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let inner_plaintext_length = inner_plaintext.len();
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// {
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// self.session.borrow_mut()
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// .server_update_for_server_finished(&inner_plaintext[..(inner_plaintext_length-1)]);
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// }
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}
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// Other states regarding server role
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